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Abstract 
∎ The December 2018 Global Compact on Refugees reaffirmed the inter-
national community’s commitment to refugee protection – yet willing-
ness to accept refugees is in decline globally. 
∎ No progress has been seen in the search for viable modes of responsibility-
sharing. With the exception of Germany, all the main host countries are 
middle-income or developing countries. 
∎ In a situation where more people are forced to leave their homes than are 
able to return every year, the more affluent countries must shoulder more 
responsibility. That would mean pledging more resettlement places and 
increasing public and private funding to relieve the poorer host countries. 
∎ Aid organisations regularly find themselves faced with funding shortfalls. 
As the second-largest donor of humanitarian and development funding, 
Germany should campaign internationally to expand the available finan-
cial resources and improve the efficiency of their use. 
∎ None of the new funding ideas will master the multitude of demands on 
their own. New and pre-existing financing instruments should therefore 
be combined. 
∎ The German government should collect experiences with the different 
funding approaches in its new Expert Commission on the Root Causes 
of Forced Displacement (Fachkommission Fluchtursachen). The Global 
Refugee Forum, which meets for the first time in December 2019, pro-
vides an opportunity to start a discussion on new ways of mobilising the 
required funds for international refugee protection. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Growing Needs, Insufficient Resources. 
How to Fund International Refugee 
Protection? 
The willingness to accept refugees has declined glob-
ally. Many industrialised countries in particular have 
tightened their asylum legislation, making the pro-
cess more restrictive and worsening the living con-
ditions of asylum seekers. Governments have been 
working to reduce refugee numbers and restrict new 
arrivals through agreements with transit states and 
stricter controls at external borders. The advocates 
of a harder line allege that the right to asylum has 
been abused for purposes of immigration and assert 
that refugees create unacceptable economic and 
social burdens. Critics of the restrictive line accuse 
their governments of violating the Geneva Refugee 
Convention, other international norms and national 
laws, and call for a more humane approach. In the 
course of these developments, refugee policy (and 
immigration as a whole) has become a central politi-
cal conflict in Europe and elsewhere. 
One result of the contentious political debate is a 
lack of coherent and sustainable approaches to inter-
national responsibility-sharing and its funding. The 
actions of the members of the United Nations have 
been contradictory: In the New York Declaration of 
December 2016 they agreed to seek closer cooperation 
and burden-sharing in refugee and migration policy, 
and concretised this in December 2018 with the 
Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact 
for Migration. But the Compact on Refugees has not 
to date led to any fundamental improvements in per-
manent resettlement in third states or voluntary 
return, nor has there been any meaningful increase 
in funding. The few pilot projects have been restricted 
to just a handful of countries. In view of the large 
numbers of refugees, it is obvious that financial aid to 
the (mostly poorer) countries that host most of them 
needs to be increased. No refugee policy can be effec-
tive without adequate funding. 
The figures for refugees and internally displaced 
persons are indeed at historic highs. More people are 
seeking refuge from violence, persecution and war 
than at any other time since the end of the Second 
World War. At the same time the duration of refugee 
situations is increasing. While the humanitarian 
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funding provided by the international community 
has increased in recent years, the needs have in-
creased even more strongly in the same period. Aid 
organisations often find themselves able to acquire 
only a fraction of the required funds, leaving a grow-
ing gap between needs and available means. 
So new funding possibilities need to be sought. 
Three questions must be answered: 1. Why is there a 
need for international action on refugee protection in 
the first place? 2. Is there really a funding shortfall or 
are existing resources being used inefficiently? 3. How 
can additional funds be mobilised? 
These are questions the German government 
should also be addressing. As the only high-income 
country among the main destinations for refugees, 
Germany attracts international attention and enjoys 
special legitimacy. It is in Germany’s own interests 
to advance the search for new funding instruments. 
The German government should advocate both 
an increase in the amount of available funding and 
improvements in its effectiveness. Financing instru-
ments should be transparent and configured in such 
a way as to strengthen ownership and participation 
of refugees and internally displaced persons and 
to facilitate close coordination between the central 
actors in humanitarian aid and development coopera-
tion. They should also ensure long-term funding. No 
single funding instrument can address such a diver-
sity of requirements; various approaches therefore 
need to be combined and applied in parallel. 
Direct payments and micro-finance services for 
refugees and internally displaced persons are espe-
cially suited to promoting self-reliance and should be 
expanded in the interests of efficacy. New financing 
instruments need to be sustainable and also benefit 
the host communities. 
In order to generate additional funding for refugee 
assistance, the German government should press for 
all members of the OECD to meet the agreed target of 
spending 0.7 percent of GNI on development coopera-
tion. Germany could set a good example by doing so 
itself. As a major donor it could also ensure that the 
financial resources it provides for refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons are more needs-oriented, 
untied, long-term and timely. This could be accom-
plished through pooled funds, which also offer pos-
sibilities to optimise the coordination of humani-
tarian aid and development cooperation. 
Other potential sources of new funding include 
leveraging private finance using public resources, 
especially in the scope of the European Union’s next 
Multiannual Financial Framework, reducing the costs 
of financial transfers, and creating “refugee bonds”. 
Additionally, the potential of concessional loans and 
grants has yet to be exhausted. 
These financing instruments will only be effective 
in a framework of closer international cooperation. 
The German government should therefore improve its 
coordination of refugee assistance with other donors, 
and in the process also expand cooperation with “new” 
donor countries and philanthropic sources (diasporas, 
businesses, foundations). To support such develop-
ments it should push for greater progress in inter-
national exchange on funding options in the course 
of implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the Glob-
al Compacts on Refugees and Migration, and feed the 
results into the corresponding forums, especially the 
Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). 
Finally, it should use new and existing national fo-
rums – including the new Expert Commission on the 
Root Causes of Forced Displacement (Fachkommission 
Fluchtursachen) – to hone Germany’s approaches to 
funding refugee assistance. 
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Numbers of refugees and migrants are growing glob-
ally, while the distinction between the two groups 
becomes increasingly blurred.1 This development 
makes it increasingly difficult for states to fulfil their 
duty to protect refugees, and many fail to do so. Na-
tional isolationism is a growing trend, eroding global 
refugee protection and leaving weak and fragile states 
bearing the brunt of the burden. The costs of refugee 
protection are increasing while – in the context of 
the international community’s fundamental commit-
ment to responsibility-sharing in the Global Compact 
for Refugees – pressure is growing to find suitable 
international approaches for funding refugee pro-
tection. 
Forced displacement: Global trends 
Global trends in internal and international forced 
displacement give grounds for concern: the number 
of refugee situations is increasing, as is their dura-
tion. At the end of 2018, the UNHCR estimated, 
“almost 70.8 million individuals were forcibly dis-
placed worldwide as a result of persecution, con-
flict, violence, or human rights violations”. Of these, 
25.9 million were international refugees under 
UNHCR’s mandate, 5.5 million Palestine refugees 
under UNRWA’s mandate and 41.3 million inter-
nally displaced persons. There were also 3.5 million 
asylum-seekers.2 
 
1 Steffen Angenendt, David Kipp and Amrei Meier, Ge-
mischte Wanderungen: Herausforderungen und Optionen einer 
Dauerbaustelle der deutschen und europäischen Asyl- und Migra-
tionspolitik (Gütersloh, 2017), http://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/Migration_fair_gestalten/ 
IB_Studie_Gemischte_Wanderungen_2017.pdf (accessed 
6 June 2019). 
2 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 (Geneva, 
2019), 2f., http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/ 
Those figures represent a new record since the 
Second World War. The most recent increase is asso-
ciated in particular with the Syrian refugee situation, 
where numbers remain high and rising, but also with 
refugee movements in Sub-Saharan Africa.3 
Most people who flee their country of origin 
remain in the region and seek refuge in neighbouring 
states. These are often the poorest countries: At the 
end of 2018 84 percent of refugees under UNHCR’s 
mandate were living in developing countries, one-
third of them in the least developed countries.4 In all 
of the ten main countries of origin of refugees (Syria, 
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African 
Republic, Eritrea, Burundi) the situation causing dis-
placement had already existed for more than five 
years in 2018.5 Internal displacement situations are 
also increasingly protracted. 
At the same time the prospects of finding lasting 
solutions are receding. UNHCR regards voluntary 
repatriation, resettlement and local integration as 
“durable solutions”. According to the statistics, 13.6 
million people were newly displaced in 2018 but only 
about 2.9 million were able to return to their areas 
or countries of origin. Although UNHCR did record an 
8 percent year-on-year increase in resettlement places 
provided by states in 2018, the number remained so 
small that it was only possible to realise about one-
tenth of the resettlements requested by UNHCR.6 In 
the case of the third lasting solution, local integra-
 
5d08d7ee7/ unhcr-global-trends-2018.html (accessed 27 June 
2019). 
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Mid-Year Trends 2018 (Geneva, 2019), 5, https:// 
www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5c52ea084/mid-year-
trends-2018.html (accessed 25 February 2019). 
4 UNHCR, Global Trends 2018 (see note 2), 2. 
5 Ibid., 15, 23. 
6 Ibid., 27–33. 
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tion, recent developments have largely been negative7 
(alongside minor improvements such as new legis-
lation in Ethiopia permitting refugees to live and work 
outside of refugee camps and easing their access to 
official documents such as birth and death certifi-
cates8). 
Fragility and responsibility-sharing 
Fragile and weak states are especially affected by the 
changes in global forced displacement.9 These coun-
tries host a large proportion of the forcibly displaced 
and face growing difficulties coping with the ensuing 
challenges. They generally lack the necessary struc-
tures and financial resources, and the task of support-
ing and protecting the forcibly displaced frequently 
exceeds their economic, political and social abilities. 
Under conditions of fragility the presence of large 
numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons 
can exacerbate pre-existing competition for natural 
resources like water, land and firewood, deepen pov-
erty, and accelerate exclusion and radicalisation, 
potentially leading to increases in crime, violence 
and political instability. Exploitation and discrimin-
ation are common side-effects of refugee situations, 
and human rights often fall by the wayside. Under 
adverse circumstances forced displacement can also 
hinder a broader reduction in poverty, interfere with 
economic growth, threaten the environment and thus 
also undermine realisation of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) agreed in the Agenda 2030. 
These problems affect both forcibly displaced and 
host populations.10 
Forced displacement under conditions of state 
fragility can thus represent a considerable impedi-
ment to development, and in the worst case eliminate 
progress already made. The risk of such trajectories 
occurring is almost certain to rise in connection with 
the growing numbers of people living in fragile situa-
tions. The World Bank estimates that the number of 
 
7 UNHCR, Global Trends 2018 (see note 2), 33. 
8 Nita Bhalla, “Ethiopia Allows Almost 1 Million Refugees 
to Leave Camps and Work”, Reuters, 17 January 2019. 
9 On the definition of fragility, see World Bank Group, 
Maximizing the Impact of the World Bank Group in Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Settings (Washington, D.C., March 2018), 6, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/855631522172 
060313/pdf/124654-WP-PUBLIC-MaximizingImpactLowres 
FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 February 2019). 
10 Ibid., 3f. 
people living below the poverty line in fragile con-
texts will increase from 513 million in 2015 to 620 
million in 2030, with more than 80 percent of the 
world’s poor experiencing situations characterised 
by precarity, conflict and violence.11 
The states that host refugees and internally dis-
placed persons – granting them protection and pro-
viding for them – are addressing immediate need, 
fulfilling a humanitarian mission. This support for 
refugees and internally displaced persons represents a 
contribution to international burden- and responsibil-
ity-sharing and is understood by certain international 
actors as a global public good.12 Yet the governments 
in question frequently have no choice but to take 
these people in if they wish to avoid a humanitarian 
crisis on their borders. 
Global decline in willingness to share 
responsibility for refugees. 
In fact, countervailing trends are observed in pro-
tection and funding: On the one hand there is a broad 
consensus within the international community that 
refugee protection is a collective task. On the other, 
the willingness of states to share the burden and take 
in refugees has been seen to decline globally. Exam-
ples include cuts to the US Resettlement Programme, 
as the world’s largest, but also the longstanding in-
ability of EU member states to agree practical respon-
sibility-sharing measures.13 Given that context, it is 
all the more important that public and private funds 
for refugee protection are sufficient, predictable, 
timely and long-term. 
 
11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), States of Fragility 2018 (Paris, 2018), 99. 
12 Lili Mottaghi, Refugee Welfare: A Global Public Good, MENA 
Knowledge and Learning Quick Notes 167/2018 (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Group, April 2018), 4, http://bit.ly/2RUVt2r 
(accessed 15 March 2019). 
13 Steffen Angenendt, Marcus Engler and Jan Schneider, 
European Refugee Policy: Pathways to Fairer Burden-Sharing, SWP 
Comment 36/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft Politik, 
November 2013), 4f., http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
contents/products/aktuell/2013A65_adt_engler_schneider.pdf 
(accessed 25 February 2019). 
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Global Refugee Compact defines 
international framework 
In response to large and growing movements of refu-
gees and migrants, the UN Secretary-General held 
a summit on the issue in September 2016. At that 
gathering the member states adopted the New York 
Declaration and agreed to prepare a Migration Com-
pact (Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration) and a Refugee Compact (Global Compact 
on Refugees). Both documents were signed in Decem-
ber 2018. While the Global Migration Compact pro-
voked sometimes heated debates within member 
states and was rejected by a number of governments, 
the more practically orientated Global Refugee Com-
pact was less controversial and gathered more 
signatories.14 
The Refugee Compact comprises two elements: a 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) 
already adopted with the New York Declaration, 
which codifies principles for cooperation in refugee 
crises, and a Programme of Action listing concrete 
measures and procedures to be observed in refugee 
protection. The Programme of Action also contains 
proposals for supporting states hosting refugees, 
meeting the needs of refugees and host communities, 
and finding lasting solutions. Altogether the Refugee 
Compact is intended to supplement rather than re-
place the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, which 
remains the backbone of international refugee pro-
tection. 
The commitments laid out in the Refugee Compact 
include greater support for host countries, above all 
by explicitly strengthening the capacities of the af-
fected communities, as well as improving economic 
perspectives for refugees (through measures including 
work permits and training) and replacing refugee 
camps with individual accommodation. Overall, the 
Compact seeks to improve coordination of activities 
between providers of humanitarian aid and of devel-
opment cooperation. 
 
14 Steffen Angenendt and Anne Koch, Der Globale Migra-
tionspakt im Kreuzfeuer: Trifft die Kritik zu? SWP-Aktuell 69/2018 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2018), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/der-globale-
migrationspakt-im-kreuzfeuer/ (accessed 11 June 2019). 
Refugee Compact offers new 
opportunities for international 
cooperation. 
Altogether the Refugee Compact offers a collection 
of useful proposals and already known “good prac-
tices” from the spheres of humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation. But it is ultimately a non-
binding declaration of intent. It names no quantita-
tive targets (for which indicators have yet to be devel-
oped). The multitude of measures mentioned in the 
Compact makes it easy for donor countries to cherry-
pick the approaches they find most attractive. The 
same applies to funding for refugee assistance: While 
the Refugee Compact calls for additional financial 
resources to be mobilised, it remains unclear where 
the required funding is supposed to come from – 
leaving aside general suggestions such as the call to 
increase private sector involvement. So the Compact 
is unconvincing in relation to future funding for 
refugee protection. 
This assessment is confirmed by the initial experi-
ence in CRRF pilot countries, where there has already 
been controversy over inadequately clarified funding 
issues. For example Tanzania and Uganda received 
much praise in recent years for taking in large num-
bers of refugees and operating a generous refugee 
policy. But in February 2018 Tanzania withdrew 
from the CRRF citing differences with donor countries 
over funding for aid measures and refusal to take 
out (concessional) World Bank loans to fund refugee 
accommodation. Instead they expected grants. When 
the donors declined, Tanzania terminated its CRRF 
cooperation. 
In the case of Uganda too, disagreements over 
financing hindered the implementation of refugee 
assistance. Donor countries are presently reviewing 
the cooperation after allegations emerged that Kam-
pala had inflated refugee counts and misappropriated 
aid funds. Despite these difficulties, experience in 
pilot countries shows that the CRRF is a step in the 
right direction – not least because it can offer ad hoc 
financial support to countries that may have been 
hosting refugees for decades.15 
 
15 Steffen Angenendt and Nadine Biehler, On the Way to a 
Global Compact on Refugees: The “Zero Draft”: A Positive, but Not Yet 
Sufficient Step, SWP Comment 18/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, April 2018), https://www.swp-berlin. 
org/en/publication/on-the-way-to-a-global-compact-on-
refugees/ (accessed 29 August 2019). 
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Other important host countries have also raised 
demands of their own. Pakistan points to its 1.4 mil-
lion registered refugees to press for greater financial 
support – and adds that this should be supplied as 
grants rather than loans in order to avoid creating 
additional financial burdens. Iran goes a step further 
to demand a lump sum per refugee and year.16 
These implementation examples demonstrate 
the importance of the Global Refugee Compact in the 
search for new and effective approaches in refugee 
policy. They also underline the centrality of the fund-
ing question for future refugee protection. 
 
16 Background discussions with representatives of inter-
national organisations, Berlin and Geneva, February and 
March 2019. 
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The political debate about financial support for refu-
gees and internally displaced persons revolves essen-
tially around the question of whether there is a 
genuine lack of funds and a real scarcity of resources 
available for protection, provision and local integra-
tion,17 or whether the available funds are incorrectly 
allocated and the actual problem is inefficiency of 
humanitarian and development spending in situa-
tions of forced displacement.18 
This controversy resurfaces in all the relevant in-
ternational processes: The Global Refugee Compact 
also stresses the demand for stronger financial en-
gagement by donor states, arguing that international 
burden- and responsibility-sharing must first and 
foremost tackle inadequate funding because the 
developing countries are most strongly affected by 
forced displacement.19 On the other hand, the World 
Humanitarian Summit called by UN Secretary-Gen-
eral Ban Ki-moon in May 2016 in Istanbul – as the 
first global forum for consultations between govern-
ments, humanitarian organisations and civil society 
on growing global humanitarian needs – concentrated 
on efficiency issues.20 
 
17 Harriet Grant, “UN Agencies ‘Broke and Failing’ in Face 
of Ever-growing Refugee Crisis”, Guardian, 6 September 2015. 
18 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, Too Im-
portant to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap (New 
York, January 2016), 2f., http://bit.ly/2XKMjLd (accessed 25 
February 2019). 
19 UNHCR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Part II: Global Compact on Refugees, A/73/12 (Part II)/ 
2018 (New York, 2018), 6–7 (para. 32), http://www.unhcr. 
org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf (accessed 26 October 2018). 
20 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Grand Bargain 
(Hosted by the IASC) (Geneva, 2017), https://interagencystanding 
committee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc (accessed 11 Octo-
ber 2018). 
Insufficient funds 
It is not possible to precisely quantify the volume of 
international financial resources available for refugee 
situations. Information is frequently missing and the 
existing data is often not comparable. Calculations of 
humanitarian needs are often not very transparent, 
opening aid organisations to accusations that their 
appeals are exaggerated (“appeal inflation”).21 Finally, 
the two different policy areas involved in refugee 
assistance – humanitarian aid and development co-
operation – differ strongly in terms of their objec-
tives, approaches and financing instruments. 
In humanitarian aid the resources required by UN 
aid organisations are budgeted annually and aggre-
gated. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA) then registers the contributions 
committed by donor countries. While this method 
is not without its flaws, it does expose the clear gap 
between needs stated and resources provided. In past 
years the needs were never met in full (see Figure 1, 
p. 12). Even in 2017, when humanitarian aid reached 
a new record of $27.3 billion, it was far from satis-
fying the needs.22 
The UNHCR, as the central UN actor supporting 
refugees and internally displaced persons, is especially 
affected by funding shortfalls. In 2018 its funding 
requirement was $8.2 billion, of which donor coun-
tries provided just $4.7 billion (corresponding to a 
 
21 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, Too Impor-
tant to Fail (see note 18), 2. 
22 Without the appeals of the International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), see Develop-
ment Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018 
(Bristol, 2018), 27, http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
06/GHA-Report-2018.pdf (accessed 16.8.2018). 
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shortfall of about 43 percent).23 As such the funding 
gap remained roughly constant in comparison to 
2017.24 The shortfall could in fact grow if the United 
States carries through its threat to further cut its con-
tributions to the UN and thus also the UNHCR. 
Development cooperation, in contrast, is about sustain-
able change rather than immediate survival. While 
the short-term costs involved in humanitarian aid – 
for accommodation or food and water – can be 
quantified relatively precisely, it is harder to compare 
annual needs and resources in development assis-
tance, which is structurally long-term. Development 
funds committed by OECD member states are re-
corded by the OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) and coded by sector (for example health 
or education). This makes it possible to track the pur-
poses for which member states provide funds. But the 
Committee did not begin discussing breaking down 
spending on refugees and migrants until 2015, in 
 
23 UNHCR, Update on Budgets and Funding for 2018 and 2019 
(4 March 2019), 1, https://www.unhcr.org/5c7ff3484.pdf (ac-
cessed 6 June 2019). 
24 Idem, Update on Budgets and Funding for 2017 and 2018 
(26 February 2018), 1, https://www.unhcr.org/5a9fd8b12.pdf 
(accessed 14 February 2019). 
response to the large-scale refugee movements to 
Europe. In this context the member states agreed that 
donor countries could include the costs of the first 
twelve months of accommodation and support for 
refugees and asylum seekers in their official develop-
ment assistance (ODA).25 
Funds channelled largely into 
short-term projects. 
Until the results of this new calculation are pub-
lished, we have only estimates to go by. The OECD 
Development Assistance Committee estimates that 
between 2015 and 2017 about $26 billion was spent 
on supporting refugees and their host communities, 
most of which was categorised as humanitarian aid. 
While the Committee acknowledged that donor coun-
tries had tried to improve coordination between de-
velopment-led approaches and short-term emergency 
 
25 A new “migration” code introduced in 2018 records 
support provided in connection with development-related 
migration policy. An established “emergency aid” code 
already recorded humanitarian aid to all groups including 
refugees. 
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aid,26 it also noted that the proportionally higher rise 
in spending on humanitarian aid demonstrated that 
crisis response was still being prioritised over sus-
tainable and preventative measures. Additionally, 
the Committee noted, donor countries were still re-
allocating funds intended for long-term need-reduc-
tion measures to short-term objectives.27 
Despite the inadequacies of the data, it is clear that 
the funds provided for humanitarian aid and develop-
ment cooperation do not at present cover existing 
needs. In addition, it is the poorest developing coun-
tries that are most affected by the consequences of 
forced displacement. Their economic weakness means 
that they face special pressures if they are forced to 
divert their own resources into humanitarian crises 
because international aid is insufficient. Thus in 2016 
official development assistance and humanitarian aid 
represented respectively just 6.9 percent and 1.7 per-
cent of the total international financial flows to the 
twenty largest recipients of humanitarian aid.28 Like 
any other, these governments have to justify spending 
scarce budget funds on refugees to their own citizens. 
In general the official figures for spending on refu-
gees given by host countries tend to be unreliable,29 
as are the figures for refugee populations: Higher 
figures can be helpful for negotiations with donor 
countries.30 
 
 
26 Kathleen Forichon, Financing Refugee-hosting Contexts: 
An Analyis of the DAC’s Contribution to Burden- and Responsibility-
sharing in Supporting Refugees and Their Host Communities, OECD 
Development Cooperation Working Paper 48/2018 (Paris: 
OECD, December 2018), 9, http://bit.ly/2JlzIoK (accessed 
14 February 2019). 
27 OECD, Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces 
to Leave No One Behind (Paris, 2018), 272f., http://bit.ly/2LB4r3V 
(accessed 28 February 2019). 
28 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2018 (see note 22), 30. 
29 Turkey claims to have spent about $35 billion on refu-
gees between 2011 and 2018, but does not say how it arrived 
at the figure. See Sevil Erkuş, “Migrants Day: Turkey Hosts 
Largest Number of Refugees in the World”, Hürriyet Daily 
News, 18 December 2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 
migrants-day-turkey-hosts-largest-number-of-refugees-in-the-
world-139803 (accessed 6 June 2019). 
30 Anne Koch, Annette Weber and Isabelle Werenfels, eds., 
Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European 
Migration Management, SWP Research Paper 4/2018 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018), https://www. 
swp-berlin.org/en/publication/profiteers-of-migration/ 
(accessed 29 August 2019). 
In short, the analysis shows that developing coun-
tries especially affected by forced displacement fail 
to receive adequate international support. Despite 
spending their own funds they are often unable to 
sufficiently support forcibly displaced persons and 
their host communities. These problems can be 
expected to grow. 
Inefficiency 
The second important aspect of refugee financing is 
(in)efficiency of spending. There have long been com-
plaints about the inadequate effectiveness of support 
and discussion of possibilities for improving it. Cor-
responding recommendations and criteria for devel-
opment cooperation and humanitarian aid have 
The German contribution to 
international refugee protection 
Germany has significantly stepped up its efforts in recent 
years. In 2018 it became the second-largest donor of hu-
manitarian aid and development assistance after the 
United States, with a total of €21 billion (or 0.61 percent 
of GNI).a According to its own figures the German govern-
ment spent about €6.5 billion on tackling the root causes 
of forced displacement in 2016, and more than €7.3 bil-
lion in 2017.b The 2019 budget for this category of devel-
opment cooperation and humanitarian aid is (as in 2018) 
€6.9 billion. These funds are employed above all to ad-
dress structural causes (preventing violent conflicts, com-
pensating for failure of state institutions, reducing pov-
erty, inequality, lack of prospects and the consequences 
of climate change) as well as measures designed to im-
prove opportunities for refugees and displaced persons in 
host regions.c 
a Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammen-
arbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), “Deutsche ODA-Quote 
2018 verharrt bei 0,51 Prozent ohne Inlands-Flüchtlings-
kosten: Vorläufige ODA-Zahlen”, press release, Berlin, 
10 April 2019, http://www.bmz.de/20190410-1 (accessed 
28 June 2019); Ralf Südhoff and Sonja Hövelmann, 
Wo steht die Deutsche Humanitäre Hilfe? (Berlin: Centre for 
Humanitarian Action [CDA], 20 March 2019), 2. 
b Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der FDP-Fraktion: 
Engagement der Bundesregierung für die Bekämpfung von Flucht-
ursachen, 12 October 2018, Drucksache 19/4955, 5. 
c Idem, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 
der FDP-Fraktion: Effiziente und nachhaltige Bekämpfung von 
Fluchtursachen, 31 July 2018, Drucksache 19/3648, 2f. 
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emerged from numerous international forums and 
processes,31 some of which are especially relevant for 
financing refugee assistance. 
Transparency and accountability 
Transparency and accountability are preconditions 
for efficient aid allocation and spending. Their obser-
vance can contribute to reducing transaction costs, 
waste, corruption and mismanagement.32 This applies 
especially to international refugee assistance, which 
requires accurate data on numbers. In reality, how-
ever, refugee statistics are frequently incomplete.33 
The case of Uganda raised eyebrows in 2018, when 
it was revealed that the government had inflated the 
number of refugees by 300,000 and that the UNHCR 
country office had been too slow in following up on 
reports indicating the issue.34 This example under-
lines the importance of reliable data on numbers of 
refugees and their humanitarian and socio-economic 
situation for the accountability and ultimately also 
the legitimacy of international refugee protection. 
Ownership and participation 
In order to improve efficiency in the use of funds, 
there are increasing calls for greater ownership by 
 
31 OECD, Erklärung von Paris über die Wirksamkeit der Entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit: Eigenverantwortung, Harmonisierung, Part-
nerausrichtung, Ergebnisorientierung sowie gegenseitige Rechen-
schaftspflicht (Paris, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dac/effective 
ness/35023537.pdf (accessed 17 October 2018); IASC, Grand 
Bargain (see note 20). 
32 Owen Barder and Gary Forster, “Ten Years of Aid Trans-
parency – Fulfilling the Dream of Accra” (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Global Development [CGD], 5 October 2018), https:// 
www.cgdev.org/blog/ten-years-aid-transparency-fulfilling-
dream-accra; OECD, Ownership and Accountability: Summary of 
Recommendations and Terrain for Debate (2011), 1f., https://www. 
oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/48459156.pdf (both accessed 
13 June 2019). 
33 Steffen Angenendt, David Kipp and Anne Koch, Many 
Refugees, Poor Data: Development Cooperation Requires Higher-
quality Data, SWP Comment 37/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, August 2016), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
en/publication/many-refugees-poor-data/ (accessed 28 August 
2019). 
34 “Wie sich das UNHCR in Uganda um Millionen betrügen 
ließ: Uno-Bericht um ‘Geisterflüchtlinge’”, Spiegel Online, 1 De-
cember 2018, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/uno-
bericht-belegt-misswirtschaft-und-korruption-in-uganda-a-
1241386.html (accessed 6 June 2019). 
recipient governments and refugees themselves. This 
is also associated with discussion about making better 
use of the institutions and administrative structures 
of the recipient countries and involving national and 
local (humanitarian) actors more closely in refugee 
assistance (“localisation”). More resources should flow 
to local and national organisations: at least 25 percent 
of global humanitarian aid by 2020.35 Not least, refu-
gees and internally displaced persons should be more 
closely involved in developing and implementing the 
instruments: The “Grand Bargain” agreed in 2016 in 
Istanbul even calls for a “participation revolution”.36 
Promoting ownership and self-reliance of refugees 
and internally displaced persons makes sense from 
the perspective of donor countries, because long-term 
accommodation in large camps is costly. In the me-
dium and long term it is cheaper and more sustain-
able to integrate refugees and internally displaced 
persons into national systems instead of setting up 
parallel structures – especially as the local popula-
tion also benefits. This approach is also associated 
with a hope that strengthening institutions in host 
countries might obviate potential distribution con-
flicts between refugees and the local population. 
Involving refugees more closely should make as-
sistance as a whole more targeted, cost efficient and 
sustainable.37 In comparison to other humanitarian 
emergencies, refugee situations present special chal-
lenges for participation. Apart from that, refugees are 
as a rule excluded from formal channels of participa-
tion (for example the right to vote and stand in local 
elections).38 In fact many governments also struggle 
 
35 IASC, More Support and Funding Tools for Local and National 
Responders (Geneva, 2017), https://interagencystanding 
committee.org/more-support-and-funding-tools-local-and-
national-responders (accessed 16 October 2018). 
36 Idem, A Participation Revolution: Include People Receiving 
Aid in Making the Decisions Which Affect Their Lives, https://inter 
agencystandingcommittee.org/participation-revolution-
include-people-receiving-aid-making-decisions-which-affect-
their-lives (accessed 16 October 2018). 
37 Louise Redvers, “Local Aid Agencies: Still Waiting for a 
Bigger Share of the Funding Cake”, The New Humanitarian, 27 
March 2017, https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/03/27/ 
local-aid-agencies-still-waiting-bigger-share-funding-cake 
(accessed 11 October 2018). 
38 Armend Bekaj and Lina Antara, Political Participation of 
Refugees: Bridging the Gaps (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018), 92, http:// 
www.bosch-stiftung.de/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/ 
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with participation by internally displaced persons, 
especially where they speak a different language 
than the local population and/or differ in religious or 
ethnic terms. It is therefore all the more important 
for the success of aid programmes to involve refugees 
and internally displaced persons in designing meas-
ures from the outset. 
Efficiency and effectiveness of financing 
arrangements 
Great hopes are placed in particular on cash assis-
tance, which offers recipients greater choice and can 
strengthen local markets.39 It can also be more cost-
effective than traditional food assistance and enables 
more people to be supplied.40 
International organisations engaged in humanitar-
ian aid also regularly argue for more flexible multi-year 
financing. They believe that this would reduce admin-
istrative costs for donor countries and aid organisa-
tions, and achieve better results through longer plan-
ning horizons.41 Unearmarked financing could also 
ensure that investments are made even in fragile 
situations and facilitate timely response to urgent 
and rapidly-emerging needs.42 
These proposals are especially relevant for the con-
text of forced displacement. However, in 2018 just 
11 percent of UNHCR funding was unearmarked,43 
and only 2 percent was committed as multi-year 
financing.44 Here it would be up to donors to make 
good on their promises. 
 
2018-04/Political-participation-of-refugees-bridging-the-
gaps.pdf (accessed 5 March 2019). 
39 IASC, Increase the Use and Coordination of Cash-based 
Programming, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/ 
increase-use-and-coordination-cash-based-programming 
(accessed 27 June 2019). 
40 Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Doing Cash Dif-
ferently: How Cash Transfers Can Transform Humanitarian Aid 
(London, September 2015), 18f., 21, http://bit.ly/2XpX7yW 
(accessed 21 March 2019). 
41 IASC, Increase Collaborative Humanitarian Multi-year 
Planning and Funding, https://interagencystandingcommittee. 
org/increase-collaborative-humanitarian-multi-year-
planning-and-funding (accessed 16 October 2018). 
42 Idem, Reduce the Earmarking of Donor Contributions (2017), 
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/reduce-earmark 
ing-donor-contributions (accessed 16 October 2018). 
43 UNHCR, Funding Update 2018 (Geneva, December 2018), 
41, http://bit.ly/2Yq7rnb (accessed 20 March 2019). 
44 On the basis of provisional figures. In 2017 donors com-
mitted 16 percent of funds as multi-year financing, see 
Integration of humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation 
Humanitarian aid and development cooperation are 
characterised by different objectives, principles and 
approaches, some of which stand in direct contradic-
tion to one another. For example, humanitarian prin-
ciples require neutrality and independence, whereas 
development cooperation works with – and seeks to 
strengthen – local actors and structures.45 Altogether 
there is a broad consensus that the interplay needs to 
be improved in order to respond to crises more effec-
tively and sustainably.46 
This gap is especially obvious in the context of forced 
displacement.47 The integration of the two spheres 
is indispensable for refugee protection: on the one 
hand, forcibly displaced persons require emergency 
aid to ensure their survival. On the other hand the 
increasing duration of refugee situations also neces-
sitates the longer-term approaches of development 
cooperation. The latter include for example vocational 
training to offer refugees and internally displaced 
persons a future and promote self-reliance. 
 
UNHCR, Global Appeal, 2018–2019 (Geneva, November 
2017), 47, http://www.unhcr.org/publications/fundraising/ 
5a0c05027/unhcr-global-appeal-2018-2019-full-report.html 
(accessed 20 March 2019). 
45 Karin Radtke, “Nothilfe und Konfliktbearbeitung 
(Dossier Innerstaatliche Konflikte)” (Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung [bpb], 25 January 2016), http:// 
www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/innerstaatliche-
konflikte/54757/nothilfe (accessed 25 February 2019). 
46 Laura Hammond, Welthunger-Index 2018: Flucht, Vertrei-
bung und Hunger (Bonn and Dublin, October 2018), 29; IASC, 
Grand Bargain (see note 20). 
47 The German development cooperation institute DEval 
has flagged this in relation to the major refugee movements 
in Syria. See Alexander Kocks et al., Building Bridges between 
International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced 
Migration: A Review of Conceptual and Empirical Literature with a 
Case Study on the Response to the Syria Crisis, EBA-Report 2/2018 
(Stockholm: Expert Group for Aid Studies, and German 
Institute for Development, 2018), 3f., http://www.deval.org/ 
files/content/Dateien/Evaluierung/Berichte/2018/EBA_2018_ 
02_Building_Bridges_web.pdf (accessed 28 June 2019). 
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In response to the funding problems and conceptual 
and political weaknesses of refugee assistance, there 
is discussion about what instruments can be used to 
meet the need for additional resources in this sphere 
and how the efficiency of assistance can be improved. 
The proposals span a broad spectrum, from tapping 
additional public funds to finding new donors. 
Additional public funding and 
greater flexibility 
One very obvious proposal is to provide additional 
public funding. As far back as 1970 the UN General 
Assembly recommended that the economically devel-
oped countries should provide public development 
funding representing 0.7 percent of their GNI starting 
in 1975 (ODA/GNI ratio). Few countries ever achieved 
this, the exceptions being Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Denmark. Finland, Luxembourg and the 
United Kingdom have met the target once or more.48 
Germany also reached this threshold in 2016, above 
all on account of that year’s especially high spending 
on refugees within the country – the so-called “in 
donor refugee costs”.49 Overall, however, even in 
2016 average spending by members of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee was substantially 
less than 0.4 percent of their GNI.50 In view of its lack 
of success, the point of the ODA ratio as a political 
 
48 OECD, History of the 0.7% ODA Target (Paris, 2016), 
2f., https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-history-of-the-0-7-
target.pdf (accessed 25 February 2019). 
49 BMZ, “Deutsche ODA-Quote steigt bedingt durch die 
Flüchtlingsausgaben im Inland erstmals auf 0,7 Prozent”, 
press release, Berlin, 11 April 2017, http://www.bmz.de/ 
20170411-1 (accessed 7 June 2018). 
50 OECD, Development Co-operation Report 2018 (see note 27), 
282. 
target is regularly called into question.51 On the other 
hand, the consistent international support for the 0.7 
percent target suggests that many states continue to 
believe it should remain a guideline.52 German Devel-
opment Minister Gerd Müller has – like his pre-
predecessor Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul – argued 
for the target to be retained.53 
Even where a growing need for refugee assistance 
demands rapid action, it would not be advisable to 
reallocate development funds at short notice to be 
spent on supporting refugees, internally displaced 
persons and host societies. The needs in other spheres 
of development finance are not declining and reallo-
cation would tear new holes and endanger ongoing 
development projects. On the other hand, increasing 
funding as a whole would be a useful step towards 
achieving the 0.7 percent target. 
One important aspect of the debate over public 
development funding concerns so-called untying of aid. 
 
51 Peter Wolff, Ist das 0,7%-Ziel in der Entwicklungszusammen-
arbeit noch relevant? (Bonn: German Development Institute/ 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik [DIE], 3 May 
2010), 2f., http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Kolumne_ 
Wolff.03.05.2010.pdf (accessed 25 February 2019). 
52 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit 
Outcome: Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 Sep-
tember 2005, A/RES/60/1/2005 (New York, 24 October 2005), 5, 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migratio
n/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf (ac-
cessed 25 February 2019). 
53 BMZ, “Entwicklungspolitik ist Friedenspolitik: Rede von 
Bundesentwicklungsminister Gerd Müller bei der Konferenz 
‘Sicherheit, Frieden und Entwicklung in Afrika’ am 29. März 
2017 in Berlin” (Berlin, March 2017), http://www.bmz.de/de/ 
presse/reden/minister_mueller/2017/maerz/170329_rede_ 
afrikakonferenz.html; on Wieczorek-Zeul see “Hilfe für 
Entwicklungsländer zu gering: Interview mit Heidemarie 
Wieczorek-Zeul”, Deutschlandfunk, 24 December 2004, http:// 
www.deutschlandfunk.de/hilfe-fuer-entwicklungslaender-zu-
gering.694.de.html?dram:article_id=61719 (both accessed 
13 June 2019). 
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For a long time it was customary for donors to make 
development funding conditional on goods and ser-
vices being purchased exclusively in the donor coun-
try. While obviously advantageous for donor nations, 
this increased the costs of development projects – 
experience suggests by up to 30 percent. In the mean-
time, guidance from the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee has contributed to almost doubling 
the untied share of aid from 41 percent in 1999–
2001 to 79 percent in 2018.54 Ending aid tying alto-
gether could allow recipient countries to profit even 
more from development funding, which would also 
be helpful for addressing refugee situations. 
Blended finance and 
guarantee instruments 
One option for expanding financial resources would 
be to blend public development funding more strongly 
with private resources “blended finance”). Develop-
ment banks and international financial institutions 
already have years of experience in “leveraging” 
public funds. Between 2000 and 2016 a total of 167 
such facilities were launched.55 But their formats and 
objectives varied widely. At the end of 2017 the OECD 
states agreed for the first time on a shared definition 
for this instrument, under which “blending” is “the 
strategic use of development finance for the mobilisa-
tion of additional finance towards sustainable devel-
opment in developing countries”.56 
Whether and to what extent blended finance 
instruments can really contribute to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction remains a matter 
of debate. One problem is the level of expected re-
turns on investments in public goods, which is fre-
quently decisive for private investors – who tend to 
prefer to invest in middle-income countries (with 
 
54 OECD, Untied Aid (Paris, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/dac/ 
financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-
standards/untied-aid.htm (accessed 25 February 2019). 
55 Idem, Blended Finance: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable 
Development and Climate Action in Developing Countries (Paris, 
October 2017), 11, https://www.oecd.org/cgfi/forum/Blended-
finance-Policy-Perspectives.pdf (accessed 2 April 2019). 
56 Idem, OECD DAC – Blended Finance Principles for Unlocking 
Commercial Finance for the Sustainable Development Goals (Paris, 
January 2018), 4, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-
sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/OECD-
Blended-Finance-Principles.pdf (accessed 25 February 2019). 
lower risks).57 With respect to the need to support 
refugees and internally displaced persons, countries 
like Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon would therefore 
appear more suitable for blended finance instruments 
than economically less developed countries and 
fragile states with protracted refugee situations. 
Growing significance of blended 
finance instruments. 
The importance of blended finance for develop-
ment cooperation continues to grow despite these 
concerns. Since 2007 the EU has established eight 
blending programmes for the target regions of EU 
development policy, with a total budget of €3.4 bil-
lion. The provision of those funds has led to lending 
totalling €26.2 billion and estimated investment of 
€57.3 billion in the partner countries. In addition, in 
the EU budgetary period 2014 to 2020 the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) was authorised to guarantee 
loans outside the EU totalling €27 billion. In 2018 the 
EU increased the volume to €32.3 billion and expanded 
the programme to include “root causes of migration”. 
Establishment of the External Investment Plan (EIP) 
in 2017 involved the creation of a new fund, the 
European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), 
designed to encourage private investment in devel-
oping countries. Unlike previous financing instru-
ments, the EIP is managed by the European Commis-
sion rather than the EIB. It is also entitled to grant 
guarantees to other investment banks and private 
investors within and outside the EU. Under the EIP 
framework partner countries are offered support for 
improving their investment conditions.58 A total of 
€4.1 billion from the EU budget and the European 
Development Fund is supposed to feed into the EFSD 
by 2020, creating a base capable of leveraging €44 bil-
lion in investments. The EIP’s investment policy is 
strategically orientated on the EU’s foreign policy 
objectives, as such also channelling private-sector 
capital to African countries that show willingness to 
cooperate on migration issues and contributing to 
 
57 Anis Chowdhury and Jomo K. Sundaram, “Blending 
Finance Not SDG Financing Silver Bullet”, Inter Press Service, 
30 April 2018. 
58 Mikaela Gavas and Hannah Timmis, The EU’s Financial 
Architecture for External Investment: Progress, Challenges, and 
Options, CGD Policy Paper 136/2019 (Washington, D.C.: CGD, 
January 2019), 2ff., http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/ 
eus-financial-architecture-external-investment-progress-
challenges-and-options.pdf (accessed 29 March 2019). 
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improving the employment prospects and livelihoods 
of people there.59 A major donation of €50 million 
came from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.60 
Despite this growth it is too soon to tell whether the 
instrument can meet expectations and whether the 
expected leveraging effect is realistic.61 
Even if the member states have not to date provided 
additional funds for the EIP, the EU Commission 
plans to expand this investment offensive in the EU’s 
next Multiannual Financial Framework. It is propos-
ing that a considerable proportion of the new Neigh-
bourhood, Development and International Coopera-
tion Instrument should flow into an expanded 
“EFSD+” comprising up to €60 billion.62 This measure 
could contribute to improving coordination of the 
investment decisions of the EIB, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
national development banks (above all the German 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and the French 
Agence Française de Développement). 
Closer exchange with development banks in the 
partner regions is certainly needed. A new platform 
for exchange between multilateral development 
banks was established in spring. These financial insti-
tutions want to inform themselves more fully about 
approaches in the field of forced displacement and 
migration and coordinate their projects better with 
one another.63 The African Development Bank in par-
 
59 See European Commission, “The EU’s External Invest-
ment Plan: First Projects in Africa and the Neighbourhood”, 
press release, Brussels, 11 July 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-18-4385_en.htm (accessed 9 April 2019). 
60 Idem, “Investing in Africa: The EU and Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation Commit a Further €100 Million”, press 
release, Brussels, 25 January 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-18-361_en.htm (accessed 1 April 2019). 
61 Counter Balance, The External Investment Plan: Innovative 
Instrument or Dangerous Blueprint for EU Development Policy? 
(Brussels, November 2017), 26, http://www.counter-
balance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CB_EIP_d.pdf 
(accessed 23 October 2018). 
62 European Commission, “Questions and Answers: The 
EU Budget for External Action – Fact Sheet”, press release, 
Brussels, 14 June 2018, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
MEMO-18-4124_en.htm (accessed 6 June 2019). 
63 African Development Bank, MDBs Launch New Platform to 
Coordinate Support for Economic Migration and Forced Displacement 
(Abidjan, 20 April 2018), https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/mdbs-launch-new-platform-to-coordinate-support-for-
economic-migration-and-forced-displacement-18051/ (ac-
cessed 5 September 2018). 
ticular has recently begun devoting greater attention 
to the topics of forced displacement and migration.64 
Concessional loans and grants 
Many of the world’s refugees are hosted by middle-
income countries. Although these states are often 
operating at the limits of their financial abilities and 
at risk of overindebtedness, they are generally denied 
access to concessional loans at advantageous terms 
from development banks. Such loans – which come 
with conditions as favourable as 1 percent interest 
and repayment periods exceeding thirty years – have 
to date been granted only to low-income countries. 
For example Jordan and Lebanon, as two of the 
main countries hosting Syrian refugees, face great 
financial challenges. In order to support these two 
middle-income countries the World Bank established 
the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) in 
April 2016 as a joint project with the United Nations, 
the Islamic Development Bank and other actors. The 
GCFF supports middle-income countries that have 
taken in large numbers of refugees through conces-
sional financing of development projects. 
The GCFF is designed to reduce interest rates to 
concessional levels with the help of donor contribu-
tions. The donor countries’ funds are supposed to 
be used to tie loans from so-called implementation 
support agencies to conditions. These agencies are 
development banks that offer low-interest loans and 
possess development expertise. The hope here is that 
the leveraging effect will release about four dollars 
in concessional loans for every dollar provided by 
donors.65 
The mechanism is currently funding seven projects 
in Jordan and four in Lebanon.66 The priority areas 
are infrastructure (especially water supply and treat-
 
64 See idem, Africa Resilience Forum 2019: Fragility, Migration 
and Resilience, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, March 4–6, 2019 
(Abidjan, 2019), 1f., http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/ 
afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/ARF_CONCEPT_NOTE_ 
2019.pdf (accessed 25 March 2019). 
65 World Bank Group, 2017–2018 Annual Report: Global 
Concessional Financing Facility (Washington, D.C., 2018), 8, 
https://globalcff.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/GCFF-
Annual-Report-2018_181113.pdf (accessed 28 June 2019). 
66 Although the GCFF annual report lists four projects in 
Lebanon that the Steering Committee identified as worth 
funding, only two have to date been approved by the Leba-
nese parliament. Ibid., 25ff. 
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ment and energy), job creation and improving eco-
nomic perspectives for locals and refugees. Colombia 
was granted $31.5 million from the GCFF in April 
2019.67 
To date nine countries and the European Commis-
sion have supported the GCFF financially. As of June 
2018, $574 million had been promised or already 
paid out, releasing concessional loans totalling $2.5 
billion. The biggest donors were Japan ($110 million), 
the United Kingdom ($87 million) and the United 
States ($75 million). Germany also supports the fund 
financially: as of June 2018 the German contribution 
was €20 million, provided for Lebanon and Jordan.68 
However, some observers criticise the GCFF’s cum-
bersome and state-centred funding policies. NGOs and 
SMEs have to date been excluded from access to the 
funds.69 Expanding access to NGOs and SMEs would 
enhance their flexibility and offer them more cost-
effective solutions without transaction costs. Even 
more importantly, such a step would conform with 
the “Grand Bargain” promise of localisation.70 
Concessional loans can target support 
especially effectively. 
Since mid-2017 the World Bank has also been pro-
viding additional funding to support refugees in low-
income countries. The International Development 
Association (IDA), the World Bank’s division for the 
world’s poorest countries, was provided with a sub-
window of $2 billion for the period until mid-2020 
specifically for refugees.71 The initial eight recipient 
 
67 World Bank, “US$ 31.5 Million to Help Improve Services 
for Migrants from Venezuela and Host Communities in Co-
lombia”, press release, Washington, D.C., 12 April 2019, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/12/ 
us315-million-to-help-improve-services-for-migrants-from-
venezuela-and-host-communities-in-colombia (accessed 
28 June 2019). 
68 World Bank Group, 2017–2018 Annual Report 
(see note 65), 25, 55. 
69 Dani Marcheva, Olivia Matthews and Dominique Souris, 
“Innovative Financing Mechanisms for the ‘Age of Refugees’: 
Opportunities for Canadian Leadership”, in Cracks in the Lib-
eral International Order – 2018 Global Trends Report: An Anthology 
of Briefing Notes by CIGI Graduate Fellows at the Balsillie School 
of International Affairs, ed. Balsillie School of International 
Affairs (Waterloo, CAN, 2018), 62f. 
70 IASC, Grand Bargain (see note 20). 
71 IDA was founded in 1960 to complement the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Today 
countries (Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Niger, Pakistan, 
Uganda) were joined by five more in 2018 (Bangla-
desh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mauritania, Rwanda). 
The IDA is used to promote refugees’ access to 
education and integration in the labour market, and 
to support host communities. It is also supposed to 
strengthen state institutions and economic and rule-
of-law structures. The recipient countries (with one 
exception) currently receive financial support as half 
grant, half concessional loan.72 However the obliga-
tion to repay (at least a part) could discourage take-
up. Reservations of that kind have already led Tan-
zania to withdraw from the Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF), which was established 
as part of the Global Refugee Compact.73 
Funding through the Global Concessional Financ-
ing Facility and the IDA refugee sub-window is tied 
to particular preconditions: recipient countries must 
have taken in at least 25,000 refugees, who must 
represent at least 0.1 percent of their population.74 
The observance of specific standards of protection is 
required, as is the willingness to develop long-term/ 
permanent solutions for refugees. Currently the 
World Bank and UNHCR decide whether a country 
receives funds. Other aspects also play a role, in-
cluding the country’s financial situation, its debt 
 
it has 173 member states. The IDA’s objective is to promote 
development and raise living standards in the poorest coun-
tries, principally through long-term low-interest or interest-
free loans and grants. The IDA is funded principally through 
donor contributions, and is replenished every three years. 
In its 18th budget period (IDA 18) it has $75 billion for the 
financial years 2018 to 2020. One of its priorities is tackling 
the causes of displacement. See IDA, IDA18 Mid-Term Review: 
Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (Washington, D.C., 24 October 
2018), 29ff., http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
259151542812499052/pdf/ida18-mtr-fcv-10252018-6367627 
50035047342.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 
72 Only Bangladesh has received funds entirely as grants. 
These must be exclusively used for refugee-related projects, 
ibid., 32. 
73 Angenendt and Biehler, On the Way to a Global Compact on 
Refugees (see note 15), 3. 
74 World Bank Group, Global Concessional Financing Facility: 
Operations Manual (Washington, D.C., 2017), 5, https:// 
globalcff.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CFF-Operations-
Manual-as-amended-on-4-20-17.pdf; IDA, IDA18 Regional Sub-
Window for Refugees and Host Communities, Washington, D.C., 
2018, http://ida.worldbank.org/replenishments/ida-18 
replenishments/ida18-regional-sub-window-for-refugees-host-
communities (both accessed 3 April 2019). 
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burden and the socio-economic impact of hosting 
refugees. 
Like the Global Concessional Financing Facility, the 
IDA refugee sub-window also represents an important 
innovation seeking to employ resources in a better 
and more targeted fashion and to relieve the pressure 
on host countries. But it would appear questionable 
whether the 50/50 rule prescribed for the refugee sub-
window makes sense. The World Bank’s October 2018 
Mid-Term Review therefore proposes further excep-
tions for acute refugee crises: in future the IDA should 
be able to “provide 100 percent grants to countries 
that experience a massive inflow of refugees, defined 
as receiving at least 250,000 new refugees or at least 
1 percent of its population within the last twelve 
months”.75 
Pooled funds 
Pooled funds represent another important method 
for funding humanitarian aid. In this arrangement 
multiple donors pay their contributions into a fund 
administered by an international organisation. The 
UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund has accumu-
lated more than $5.3 billion since it was created in 
2006, and provided support in 101 countries.76 Unlike 
other sources of financing, it enables humanitarian 
actors to employ resources precisely, quickly and 
flexibly. Such funds are especially suitable for risky 
projects: 37 out of 66 pooled funds projects to date 
were in fragile contexts.77 Additionally this financing 
method tends to contribute to strengthening local 
and national humanitarian aid partners. The country-
based pooled funds administered by OCHA, for exam-
ple, are directly accessible to local actors.78 
EU Emergency Trust Fund can 
improve political coherence. 
At the end of 2015 the EU merged its financial 
resources for displacement- and migration-related 
 
75 IDA, IDA18 Mid-Term Review (see note 71), 32. 
76 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), The Central Emergency Response Fund: A Fund for All by 
All (New York, September 2018), 1, http://bit.ly/303K1Eu 
(accessed 25 September 2018). 
77 OECD, States of Fragility 2018 (see note 11), 245. 
78 Ralf Südhoff and Sonja Hövelmann, Wo steht die Deutsche 
Humanitäre Hilfe? (Berlin: Centre for Humanitarian Action 
[CDA], 20 March 2019), 7. 
support for African partner states with the EU Emer-
gency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). This brought 
together previously separate EU funds for the policy 
areas external affairs, internal affairs, development 
cooperation, humanitarian aid and neighbourhood 
policy in a single fund. Although the EUTF was origi-
nally supposed to be a temporary instrument for 
emergencies, the EU Commission has come to see it 
as a financing model for the EU’s future external 
migration policy. 
The EUTF has improved both coordination among 
the EU institutions themselves and their own coordi-
nation with the member states. However the member 
states may in future push more strongly to channel 
it into containing irregular migration. These funds 
would then be lacking for long-term support for coun-
tries of origin and refugee hosting countries, and for 
creating legal migration options.79 
Emerging donors 
While there is not yet a universally accepted defini-
tion of the “new donors”, the term is widely accepted 
to include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa, along with Turkey, South Korea and the United 
Arab Emirates as well as other Arab states such as 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.80 Few of these countries 
are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee,81 and many of them have only emerged 
 
79 David Kipp, From Exception to Rule – the EU Trust Fund for 
Africa, SWP Research Paper 13/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, December 2018), 16f., 24f., https://www. 
swp-berlin.org/en/publication/eu-trust-fund-for-africa/ (ac-
cessed 29 August 2019). 
80 Ngaire Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, 
Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development 
Assistance”, International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 1205–21; 
Julie Walz and Vijaya Ramachandran, Brave New World: A 
Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of 
Foreign Assistance, CGD Working Paper 273/2011 (Washington, 
D.C.: CGD, November 2011), 10–15, http://www.cgdev.org/ 
sites/default/files/1425691_file_Walz_Ramachandran_Brave_
New_World_FINAL.pdf (accessed 7 June 2018). 
81 The exceptions are South Korea, member since 2010, 
and the United Arab Emirates, which is not a member but a 
participant since 2014. See “DAC Members”, OECD, http:// 
www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm; “DAC Member Profile: 
Korea”, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/korea.htm, and 
“The United Arab Emirates Becomes the First Participant in 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)”, OECD, 
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as substantial donors over the past decade or two. 
Some of them were until recently recipient countries 
themselves (or even remain so).82 Their designation as 
“new” donors can be misleading: In particular Arab 
states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates have decades of experience as comparably 
generous supporters, above all of other Arab states.83 
But it is also alleged that their aid payments lack 
predictability and that they pursue geopolitical and 
economic interests.84 
It is estimated that the new donors provided be-
tween $10 and $15 billion for development coopera-
tion in 2012, representing about 7–10 percent of 
total global official development assistance.85 In fact, 
China became the world’s sixth-largest bilateral donor 
in 2013.86 But the assistance China provides as loans 
is a great deal larger, and today Beijing is Africa’s 
largest creditor.87 Even if reliable data on the financ-
ing behaviour of the new donors is often unavailable 
and their activities rarely comparable with those of 
other donor countries – for example because their 
understanding of development cooperation deviates 
from the DAC standards88 – these countries can be 
 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/uae-participant-
dac.htm (all accessed 7 March 2019). 
82 Laurence Chandy, New in Town: A Look at the Role of 
Emerging Donors in an Evolving Aid System (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/new-in-
town-a-look-at-the-role-of-emerging-donors-in-an-evolving-
aid-system/ (accessed 7 June 2018). 
83 Walz and Ramachandran, Brave New World (see note 80), 
3f. 
84 Danae Panissié, “‘A Friend for All’?’ Thoughts on 
Emirati Aid to the Middle East and Central Asia”, Disorient, 
23 July 2016, http://www.disorient.de/blog/friend-all-thoughts-
emirati-aid-middle-east-and-central-asia (accessed 7 June 2019). 
85 Chandy, New in Town (see note 82); other sources put the 
volume at $11 to $42 billion (corresponding to 8 to 31 per-
cent of global ODA), see Walz and Ramachandran, Brave New 
World (see note 80), 1. 
86 Devex, Devex Reports: Emerging Donors (Washington, D.C., 
April 2015), 6, https://pages.devex.com/rs/devex/images/ 
Devex_Reports_Emerging_Donors.pdf?aliId=1897391648 
(accessed 7 June 2018). 
87 Between 2000 and 2017 China issued loans totalling 143 
billion to African states and businesses, see “China in Afrika: 
Gute Kreditgeber, schlechte Kreditgeber”, Deutsche Welle, 17 
February 2019. 
88 Walz and Ramachandran, Brave New World (see note 80), 6. 
expected to increase their contributions to develop-
ment finance.89 
In relation to refugee situations, however, the new 
donors’ contributions have been small to date. While 
China’s share of global GDP in 2017 was about 15 per-
cent (United States: 24 percent), its share of UNHCR 
funding was just 0.3 percent (against 37.2 percent for 
the United States). India, which according to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund has the sixth-largest economy, 
is not even listed as a state contributor in the UNHCR 
statistics. Brazil, which in 2017 accounted for 2.7 per-
cent of global GDP, supplied just 0.02 percent of the 
UNHCR’s contributions.90 
“New donors”: great potential, 
but risks too. 
What all the new donors are regarded as sharing in 
common is that they tie their development coopera-
tion and humanitarian aid to economic and geopoliti-
cal interests,91 which is presumably why most of 
them concentrate their activities in their own neigh-
bourhood.92 Also it is feared that autocratic and cor-
rupt donor countries could represent an obstacle to 
sustainable development.93 On the other hand, the 
developing countries do not necessarily regard the 
resulting diversity of donors as negative, because they 
can exploit the resulting competition (for example 
 
89 Devex, Devex Reports: Emerging Donors (see note 86), 2; 
Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence?” (see note 80), 1215. 
90 Authors’ calculations using figures from IMF and 
UNHCR, see IMF, World Economic Outlook Database: Report for 
Selected Countries and Subjects (April 2018), https://bit.ly/2pd6oHq, 
and UNHCR, Contributions to UNHCR – 2017: As at 14 February 
2018, in US Dollars (February 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/ 
5954c4257.html (Zugriff jeweils am 13 June 2019). 
91 Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence?” (see note 80), 
1205; Jin Sato et al., How Do “Emerging” Donors Differ from 
“Traditional” Donors? An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid 
in Cambodia, JICA-RI Working Paper 2/2010 (Tokyo: JICA 
Research Institute, 2010), 22f., https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-
ri/publication/workingpaper/jrft3q00000022dd-att/JICA-
RI_WP_No.2_2010.pdf (accessed 7 June 2018). 
92 Devex, Devex Reports: Emerging Donors (see note 86), 2. 
93 Moises Naim, “Rogue Aid: What’s Wrong with the For-
eign Aid Programs of China, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia? 
They Are Enormously Generous: And They Are Toxic”, 
Foreign Policy (online), 15 October 2009; Richard Manning, 
“Will ‘Emerging Donors’ Change the Face of International 
Co-operation?” Development Policy Review 24, no. 4 (2006): 
371–85; Walz and Ramachandran, Brave New World (see 
note 80), 1. 
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over the degree of conditionality) to their own ends.94 
One advantage the new donors possess is that their 
relations with the recipient countries are not bur-
dened by any colonial legacy – unlike the members 
of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. 
In that context, triangular cooperation between 
OECD states, new donors and developing countries 
represents a promising approach. In the scope of such 
cooperation the financial potential of the OECD states 
could be combined with the specific knowledge and 
technical expertise of the new donors, for example 
in overcoming poverty (such as Brazil’s experience 
with cash transfers tied to conditions such as children 
attending school or medical check-ups), and better 
adapted to the challenges in the target countries. But 
the potential of such cooperation has yet to be prop-
erly researched.95 
Despite these uncertainties, the new donors can be 
expected to play an important role in future financ-
ing of refugee assistance: Here their economic and 
geopolitical self-interest could offer a guarantee that 
their engagement will be sustainable, for example in 
dealing with crises and forced displacement in their 
immediate neighbourhood. International framework 
agreements such as the Global Refugee Compact, 
the Sustainable Development Goals and the principles 
of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda could serve as the 
shared basis for constructive cooperation between 
the OECD states, the new donors and the recipient 
countries. 
Mobilising private finance 
International refugee assistance is still largely pub-
licly financed, although today one quarter of humani-
tarian aid already originates from private sources. The 
recipients of the latter are primarily NGOs.96 The share 
of private contributions to the UNHCR budget is small 
on the other hand, although a noticeable rise has 
been recorded here too: from 2 percent in 2007 to 10 
percent in 2017 (from $34 million to $400 million).97 
 
94 Walz and Ramachandran, Brave New World (see note 80), 
17f.; Sato et al., How Do “Emerging” Donors Differ from “Tra-
ditional” Donors? (see note 91), 17ff., 36f. 
95 Walz and Ramachandran, Brave New World (see note 80), 
16–20. 
96 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Report 2018 (see note 22), 41–44. 
97 United Nations, Executive Committee of the High Com-
missioner’s Programme, Private Sector Fundraising and Partner-
UNHCR is seeking to considerably increase the pro-
portion, hoping to acquire $1 billion annually from 
the private sector by 2025. Two-thirds of that is to 
come from individual donors, the rest from businesses, 
foundations and philanthropists.98 
The potential of private support for humanitarian 
aid extends beyond direct financing. One instrument 
is “impact investing”, where the investors carry a risk 
because repayment of the invested capital is condi-
tional on the success of the measure. This concept has 
been discussed above all in the context of financing 
the Sustainable Development Goals, but there are also 
proposals to apply the impact investing model in hu-
manitarian aid too.99 The idea of introducing insur-
ance solutions to cover the financial risk of refugee 
situations appears less viable,100 above all because the 
drivers of displacement – such as armed conflict, 
persecution and massive human rights violations – 
are uninsurable risks.101 
Private funding offers scope. 
Another approach proposes using state guarantees 
to secure loans on the international capital markets, 
which can then be employed for example to fund vac-
cination programmes in developing countries. Repay-
ments are made out of future development aid from 
donor countries. A similar form of public-private part-
nership is also conceivable for refugee support. “Refu-
gee bonds” could be issued, investing development 
and humanitarian aid funds in the capital markets in 
order to create planning security for host countries 
and incentives for local integration of refugees.102 A 
 
ships (August 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/5ba354764.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2019), 3. 
98 UNHCR, Global Appeal, 2019 Update (Geneva, 2019), 51, 
http://bit.ly/2YtkeVS (accessed 3 July 2019). 
99 ICRC, The World’s First “Humanitarian Impact Bond” 
Launched to Transform Financing of Aid in Conflict-Hit Countries 
(Geneva, 6 September 2017), https://www.icrc.org/en/ 
document/worlds-first-humanitarian-impact-bond-launched-
transform-financing-aid-conflict-hit (accessed 25 October 
2018). 
100 Corinna Müller et al., Insurance: A New Approach for 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (Eschborn: 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
[GIZ], August 2018), 19. 
101 Ibid., 7. 
102 Gary Kleiman, “Sovereign Bonds to Aid Refugee Crisis”, 
The Bulletin (OMFIF), November 2017, https://www.omfif.org/ 
analysis/the-bulletin/2017/november/sovereign-bonds-to-aid-
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proposal to test this approach in a pilot project to im-
prove the living conditions of refugees in Lebanon 
and Jordan is currently under discussion. The bond 
initially seeks to raise €25 million in donor contribu-
tions and €20 million in investment.103 Under that 
condition the Ikea Foundation has announced it 
would take a stake of €6.8 million. The design as an 
“impact bond” means that the investors initially bear 
the risk but receive their contribution back from 
public development funds if a previously stipulated 
target – such as getting an additional five thousand 
refugee children into school – is achieved.104 Setting 
up such a bond is, however, costly and time-consum-
ing.105 
In terms of strengthening the local economy, other 
tried and tested instruments of development coopera-
tion are also available. These include the so-called 
graduation approach that combines measures for social 
security, for improving the health services, for finan-
cial inclusion, for labour market integration and for 
vocational training.106 For example the concept of 
using micro-credit to create safety nets and employ-
ment for the poorest developed by the micro-finance 
institution Bangladesh Rural Advancement Commit-
tee has been adapted by the UNHCR in a number 
of countries and employed in refugee situations. In 
order to strengthen social cohesion, up to one quarter 
of the project participants should be from the respec-
tive host communities. These pilot programmes are 
also costly and time-consuming. But initial reports 
suggest that they have positive effects on the income 
 
refugee-crisis/ (accessed 24 October 2018). Proposals to estab-
lish so-called diaspora bonds prepared the ground, see Suhas 
L. Ketkar and Dilip Ratha, “Diaspora Bonds: Tapping the 
Diaspora during Difficult Times”, Journal of International Com-
merce, Economics and Policy 1, no. 2 (2010): 251–63. 
103 Barnaby Willitts-King et al., New Financing Partnerships 
for Humanitarian Impact (London, 2019), https://www.odi.org/ 
sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12581.pdf (accessed 
28 February 2019), S. 19. 
104 Chris Breen, “4 Things to Know about the IKEA Foun-
dation Refugee Impact Bond”, Global Business Coalition for Edu-
cation (online), 25 February 2019, https://gbc-education.org/ 
4-things-to-know-about-the-ikea-foundation-refugee-impact-
bond/ (accessed 5 March 2019). 
105 Willitts-King et al., New Financing Partnerships (see note 
103), 19. 
106 Barbara Rohregger, Die Rolle von sozialer Sicherung für die 
Ernährungssicherung (Bonn: GIZ, 2017), 17, https://repository. 
publisso.de/resource/frl:6403285/data (accessed 8 November 
2018). 
and employment situation of participants.107 Reliable 
evidence concerning long-term effects is not yet avail-
able.108 
The inability to acquire a work permit frequently 
represents an impediment to local integration. This 
aspect is addressed by the proposal to establish special 
economic zones, where refugees may be legally employed. 
In return the firms in question receive favourable 
trade arrangements.109 This approach has been tested 
in Jordan, Lebanon and Ethiopia, with limited success 
to date. The problems became most clear in connec-
tion with the so-called Jordan Compact:110 Here it pro-
ved almost impossible to find refugees who satisfied 
the requirements of the textile manufacturers.111 
If this approach was tailored more closely to the 
respective context, it might yet be able to make a 
contribution to improving the situation of refugees 
and social cohesion in the host countries and ulti-
mately also reducing the funding needs associated 
with protracted refugee situations. This has led to 
discussion about sustainable development zones as 
a specific iteration of the special economic zone. 
These would possess their own institutional and legal 
framework to promote economic activity by refu-
gees.112 But the implementation of such proposals 
would involve risks in terms of human rights and 
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international law. The associated tax breaks would 
also be problematic: they could erode important 
sources of revenue for developing countries,113 while 
also potentially exposing the affected states to accu-
sations of being tax havens.114 
Philanthropy 
The engagement of private charitable foundations in 
development cooperation has been growing steadily 
for two decades.115 According to an OECD survey the 
total volume remains small and concentrated in just 
a few sectors: between 2013 and 2015 private foun-
dations contributed $23.9 billion, representing 5 per-
cent of total official development assistance ($462 
billion). According to the OECD, the activities of the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation play a significant 
role in the growth of contributions from major foun-
dations. Because the foundations channel almost all 
their contributions through implementing organisa-
tions (rather than spending it directly themselves) 
they represent an important source of funding for 
civil society organisations and NGOs in times when 
public funding is scarce. To date, most foundation 
funds have flowed to middle-income countries like 
China, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and South 
Africa, rather than to least developed countries. One 
of the OECD’s criticisms is that such foundations 
operate largely outside public control and without 
accountability or transparency.116 
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(see note 115), 32f. 
Private foundations and diasporas: 
effective but lacking accountability. 
Nevertheless foundations can supply valuable assis-
tance in refugee situations because they can take a 
longer view. Precisely because they are less publicly 
accountable, they may be more able to take financial 
risks and test new ideas and approaches. Also they 
are often closely connected to the private sector, espe-
cially when their capital originates from entrepre-
neurial activity. 
Diaspora philanthropy is also of great relevance for 
the context of forced displacement. Although critics 
point to the danger that the interests of members of 
the diaspora are not necessarily identical to those of 
the population in the country of origin, or may even 
contradict development strategies,117 diaspora com-
munities nevertheless frequently supply emergency 
aid in crises and disasters, engage for the long term 
or conduct lobbying in the donor countries. It is also 
observed that increasing migration by the highly 
qualified leads to growth in the number of wealthy 
diaspora members, who even in the second and sub-
sequent generations find it easier to maintain contact 
with the community of origin. 
The spectrum of diaspora engagement is very broad, 
ranging from individual financial transfers through 
donations to organisations and the establishment of 
foundations by prominent cultural figures, sports 
stars and businesspeople. At the same time, especially 
among diasporas from countries with poor govern-
ance, there is often mistrust of their institutions. For 
that reason donations are frequently channelled 
directly to the recipient, because that allows the donor 
to keep better track of where the money has gone. 
One approach to strengthen the engagement of dias-
pora actors – also in refugee assistance – might be 
to promote their capacities (for example in relation to 
financial management) in the scope of development 
cooperation.118 
 
117 Iain Hay and Samantha Muller, “Questioning Generosity 
in the Golden Age of Philanthropy: Towards Critical Geogra-
phies of Super-philantropy”, Progress in Human Geography 38, 
no. 5 (2014): 635–53 (642). 
118 Kathleen Newland, Aaron Terrazas and Roberto 
Munster, Diaspora Philanthropy: Private Giving and Public Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: USAID/Migration Policy Institute, Sep-
tember 2010), 8–23, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
research/diaspora-philanthropy-private-giving-and-public-
policy (accessed 7 June 2018). 
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Remittances 
Research by the World Bank has shown that remit-
tances from migrants have long exceeded the entirety 
of official development assistance by a factor of three 
or four, and continue to increase. Thus in 2018 re-
mittances to low- and middle-income countries grew 
by 11 percent compared to the previous year (to $528 
billion). As such they also far exceeded the rise in for-
eign direct investment in these countries.119 
Research into remittances by refugees remains 
patchy.120 For example it is not possible to distinguish 
between remittances from refugees and from migrants 
(who migrated earlier to the country in question). At 
the same time there is a consensus among researchers 
that it makes a difference whether people migrate 
voluntarily or under duress. Financial transfers from 
refugees are as a rule smaller than those from 
migrants, because the former generally need time to 
find paid employment,121 and in general the incentive 
to send money home is smaller because of the smaller 
likelihood of returning.122 At the same time there are 
numerous examples of countries from which larger 
numbers of people have fled where remittances today 
account for a considerable share of GDP.123 
Refugees may be both recipients and senders of 
such financial transfers: As recipient they may use 
the money to settle in the host country or to fund 
their onward migration; as sender they may support 
those who remained in the country of origin and 
contribute to expanding the economic activity of the 
population there. Transfers can thus play a role in 
strengthening the resilience of people and institu-
tions in the states of origin. And they can encourage 
 
119 Mahmoud Mohieldin and Dilip Ratha, Migration Can 
Support Economic Development If We Let It: Here’s How (Geneva, 
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/migration-
myths-vs-economic-facts/ (accessed 6 June 2019). 
120 Carlos Vargas-Silva, Literature Review: Remittances Sent 
to and from Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Knomad 
Working Paper 12/2016 (Washington, D.C., March 2016), iii, 
http://bit.ly/2XaW5G7 (accessed 5 June 2019). 
121 Uri Dadush, The Economic Effects of Refugee Return and 
Policy Implications (Rabat: OCP Policy Center, October 2017), 
37, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ 
RefugeeReturnOCPPC-1.pdf (accessed 8 November 2018). 
122 Vargas-Silva, Literature Review (see note 120), 11. 
123 Frank Feeley et al., Remittance Flows to Post-conflict States: 
Perspectives on Human Security and Development (Boston, 2013), 
59–133, https://hdl.handle.net/2144/22904 (accessed 10 Sep-
tember 2018). 
vulnerable population groups to remain in the home 
country. Remittances can also assist with reconstruc-
tion after violent conflict.124 They are especially rele-
vant in such contexts because they flow even in situa-
tions where there is little prospect of investment.125 
Financial transfers are often 
too expensive. 
A closer examination of financial transfers to the 
ten most important countries of origin of refugees re-
veals how strongly the economic situation in the host 
country influences the level of remittances. Transfers 
from high-wage countries like Germany and middle-
income countries like Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon 
are especially large. Whereas migrants generally pos-
sess well-established channels for remittances, it takes 
time to establish new transfer channels in refugee 
situations.126 
If financial transfers are truly to assist refugees and 
internally displaced persons they must be secure and 
affordable. The World Bank and the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) have published prac-
tical proposals for ensuring this.127 The German gov-
ernment has taken up these approaches, including 
through the online portal “Geldtransfair”, which was 
set up by the German Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on behalf of the German Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (BMZ). By enhancing transparency, the portal 
seeks to reduce transfer costs.128 The World Bank 
sees a need for action concerning pricing of financial 
transfers and great potential for reducing costs, espe-
 
124 El-Zoghbi et al., The Role of Financial Services in Humanitar-
ian Crises (see note 108), 2ff. 
125 Patricia Weiss Fagen, Remittances in Conflict and Crises: 
How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises and Transitions 
to Peace, Access Finance 11/2006 (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, May 2006), 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ 
en/488061468763521395/pdf/389570AF110Fagen01PUBLIC1. 
pdf (accessed 8 November 2018). 
126 Vargas-Silva, Literature Review (see note 120), 4. 
127 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Hand-
book to Develop Projects on Remittances: Good Practices to Maximize 
the Impact of Remittances on Development (Brussels, 2014), https:// 
publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/manual_de_remesas_ 
en_0.pdf (accessed 1 March 2019). 
128 “Mehr Transparenz auf dem Geldtransfermarkt”, 
Geldtransfair website, 2019, https://www.geldtransfair.de/ 
compare/-/150 (accessed 25 March 2019). 
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cially in the most expensive transfer channels, for 
example to and within Sub-Saharan Africa.129 
In general it must be remembered that inter-
national donors have no decisive influence on the 
level, timing or recipients of financial transfers. But 
the overall volume of remittances and their impor-
tance – especially in times of crisis – give an indi-
cation of the kind of reserves that could be tapped 
with affordable transfer structures. 
 
 
129 World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide: An Analysis of 
Trends in Cost of Remittances Services: Issue 28 (Washington, D.C., 
December 2018), 5, 10, https://remittanceprices.worldbank. 
org//sites/default/files/rpw_report_december_2018.pdf (ac-
cessed 1 March 2019). 
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Numerous financing instruments that could be of 
relevance in refugee situations are currently under 
discussion. Even if some of the approaches cannot 
yet be evaluated – because the data is inadequate or 
they are still under development – none of them can 
be expected to close the growing funding shortfalls in 
humanitarian aid and development cooperation on 
their own. What is needed is a combination of ap-
proaches – including existing instruments – that 
ensures that these forms of financing fulfil the effi-
ciency criteria laid out above: They should (1) be 
transparent and enable accountability, (2) strengthen 
ownership and participation, (3) be effective in the 
longer term and (4) promote (or at least not hinder) 
the coordination of humanitarian aid and develop-
ment cooperation. 
If these criteria are applied to the financing instru-
ments discussed above, the following points emerge: 
∎ In relation to transparency and accountability, blended 
finance, concessional loans and impact investing 
are highly suitable instruments, because their 
application is tied to events. All these instruments 
could be configured in such a way as to achieve 
clarity about the respective purpose, allowing cor-
responding evidence to be supplied. In order to 
improve accountability all financing instruments 
should be based on transparent and comparable 
needs analyses. 
∎ More ownership by recipients (both governments 
and individuals) can best be achieved through 
development grants, as well as remittances and the 
graduation approach; participation is fostered by 
remittances. 
∎ With respect to effectiveness and efficiency, develop-
ment grants are recommended, while pooled funds 
also possess considerable potential if adequately 
configured, especially as they are accessible to local 
partners and permit a rapid and flexible response 
to acute crises. If refugees and host communities 
are to be supported effectively, the collection of 
socio-demographic data on refugees needs to be 
further improved, as proposed in the Global Com-
pact for Refugees. 
∎ A closer connection between humanitarian aid and devel-
opment cooperation can best be achieved through 
concessional loans, development grants and pooled 
funds, as long as that objective is also taken into 
consideration when the instruments are designed. 
In this context triangular partnerships between 
states, non-traditional donors (for example “Emerg-
ing Donors”) and private foundations can be pro-
moted. 
For the future funding of refugee assistance, three 
goals will be uppermost and demand political action: 
(1) Secure permanent basis for public funding 
Public funding will continue to be of crucial impor-
tance for refugee assistance. Currently support is 
largely provided in the humanitarian aid framework. 
That is not likely to change in any fundamental sense: 
future humanitarian emergencies will have to be 
addressed primarily through rapid acquisition of aid 
funds. Yet in view of the protracted nature of refugee 
situations it will be imperative to supplement short-
term aid with longer-term support and more sustain-
able and predictable financial resources. In order to 
ensure this it would be very helpful if the OECD states 
were to fulfil their commitments to the 0.7-percent 
target. The German government could set a good 
example by increasing its funding for humanitarian 
aid and development cooperation to a point where 
the target can regularly be met. As the world’s sec-
ond-largest donor of humanitarian aid and develop-
ment cooperation, the German government should 
also ensure that funds for refugees and internally 
displaced persons are more needs-based, long-term, 
predictable and timely. This applies especially to con-
tributions to UNHCR, which has very little unear-
marked and multi-year funding available. UNHCR’s 
experience with regional appeals for acute refugee 
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situations could serve as a model for flexible and 
innovative funding. Germany’s role as a major funder 
offers the German government – especially the Fed-
eral Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development – the oppor-
tunity to work towards improving the collaboration 
between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, for 
example through closer geographical and sectoral 
coordination. And it allows the government to create 
incentives for organisations to collaborate more 
closely on the ground. 
(2) Integrate short-term and longer-term aid 
In the research there is a consensus that refugee assis-
tance is especially effective and sustainable where 
it promotes self-reliance of refugees themselves and 
supports host communities. One (potentially rapid) 
route to strengthen self-reliance is direct payments, of 
which donor countries including Germany have made 
increasing use in recent years. With its relatively low 
transaction costs, cash-based assistance can expand the 
options open to recipients and relatively quickly 
strengthen local markets. Similar effects can also be 
achieved by micro-finance services. Greater use should 
be made of both forms of support, while paying sys-
tematic attention to sustainability. This applies espe-
cially to cash-based assistance, which is generally 
used as a substitute for or supplement to social secu-
rity measures, but could certainly also be tied to vo-
cational training initiatives. That would considerably 
enhance its effectiveness. Here too, financing must 
be sufficient, predictable, flexible and long-term. 
(3) Strengthen European and international 
cooperation 
Financing instruments that leverage private finance 
through public funds and guarantee instruments 
should be developed and implemented in the scope 
of European collaboration. The German government 
should review the pros and cons of these instruments 
and then decide whether it wishes to expand them in 
the context of the EU’s next Multiannual Financial 
Framework. In the case of concessional loans, the Ger-
man government should expand its exchange and 
cooperation with the World Bank and regional devel-
opment banks. Here it should be remembered that 
most host countries are critical towards funding 
approaches that tie aid funds to political conditions 
or provide funding as loans. Their governments often 
struggle to convince their own citizens that they 
should take out loans for refugees, especially where 
they are already heavily indebted and face growing 
economic and social burdens. The German govern-
ment should therefore work to avoid these host coun-
tries being forced into borrowing. 
Broadly speaking, many of the new financing 
instruments will remain ineffective without adequate 
intergovernmental and international cooperation. The Ger-
man government should coordinate its refugee assis-
tance closely with donors and orientate it on multi-
lateral processes and good practice identified in the 
scope of those processes. Alongside the “Grand Bar-
gain” and the obligations from the Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda, this means above all the Global Compact 
on Refugees. As well supporting the UNHCR’s core 
humanitarian mission, the German government 
should support UNHCR’s structural approaches and 
cooperation with development actors. This needs to 
go along with efforts to improve the available data, 
also through closer collaboration with the IOM. 
The Global Refugee Forum established under the 
Global Compact on Refugees offers a promising frame-
work for developing a catalogue of goals for the vari-
ous sources of financing. The Compact also specifically 
states that the private sector should play a greater 
role. Targeted investment could contribute to con-
ditions enabling refugees to contribute to economic 
development in their host countries – rather than 
simply being regarded as recipients of charity.130 
In view of the diversity of funding approaches and 
their in some cases unclear effects the German gov-
ernment should use its newly established special com-
mittee on root causes of forced displacement (Fach-
kommission Fluchtursachen) to organise a systematic 
national and international exchange on experience 
with financing instruments. The findings could flow 
into a more comprehensive German government 
strategy for financing refugee assistance. 
 
130 See Steffen Angenendt and Niels Harild, Tapping into the 
Economic Potential of Refugees. Fostering Development through Tran-
sitional Social and Economic Integration, SWP Comment 14/2017 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2017), 2f., 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
comments/2017C14_harild_adt.pdf (accessed 1 March 2019). 
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Abbreviations 
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (Bundesministerium für wirt-
schaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) 
CGD Center for Global Development (Washington, D.C.) 
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
DEval Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungs-
zusammenarbeit 
DIE German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut 
für Entwicklungspolitik 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
EFSD European Fund for Sustainable Development 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EIP External Investment Plan 
EUTF European Union Trust Fund for Africa 
GCFF Global Concessional Financing Facility 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
GNI gross national income 
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
IDA International Development Association 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
SDG Sustainable Development Goals 
SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
